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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Freddie Anthony Naranjo appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conviction for possession of methamphetamine, with a second or subsequent 
offense enhancement. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his motions to 
suppress and for reconsideration. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Twin Falls City Police Officer Kevin Loosli and his drug detection dog, 
Rocky, responded to the scene of a traffic stop involving Naranjo. (PH Tr., p.5, 
L.5- p.8, L.14; SH Tr., p.5, Ls.15-25. 1) After he arrived at the scene of the stop, 
Officer Loosli ran Rocky around the outside of Naranjo's vehicle. (PH Tr., p.8, 
Ls.15-20, p.11, Ls.14-20; SH Tr., p.6, Ls.4-13.) The vehicle, a lowered pickup 
truck, was unoccupied2 and the driver's side window was rolled down. (PH Tr., 
p.14-18; SH Tr., p.6, Ls.14-20, p.8, L.14 - p.9, L.2.) While sniffing the driver's 
side door seam, Rocky engaged in behavior the officer recognized "as the 
beginning part of alert behavior." (PH Tr., p.14, Ls.19-26.) Specifically, the 
officer testified: 
As we're trying to work the seam of the vehicle, [Rocky] pops a 
head up to the open window. Uh, he sticks his head up towards 
the window, he closes his mouth, and begins to sniff what I - I will 
1 Citations to "PH" and to "SH" are to the preliminary hearing transcript and to the 
suppression hearing transcript, respectively. The district court took judicial notice 
of the preliminary hearing transcript and considered it in ruling on Naranjo's 
motion to suppress. (SH Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4.) 
2 Naranjo was ordered to exit the truck before Officer Loosli ran Rocky around it. 



















call vigorously, but begins to sniff actively, or whatever term you'd 
like to use. His ears set back, uh, as he's sniffing. Uh, I recognize 
that as the beginning part of alert behavior. 
(PH Tr., p.14, Ls.21-26.) Rocky ultimately stuck his head inside the open driver's 
side window and, when he "came down out of the vehicle, he sat down and 
began to immediately look around," an action the officer recognized as an 
"indication for the final alert." (PH Tr., p.14, L.26 - p.15, L.6; see also SH Tr., 
p.9, Ls.3-5 (Rocky "completed" alert after putting his head in the vehicle).) After 
Rocky alerted, Officer Loosli searched Naranjo's vehicle and found 
methamphetamine residue and drug paraphernalia in the driver's side door 
panel. (PH Tr., p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.19.) 
The state charged Naranjo with possession of methamphetamine, with a 
second offense enhancement. (R., pp.64-67.) Naranjo moved to suppress the 
evidence against him, arguing it was the fruit of an unlawful search conducted 
when Rocky stuck his head inside the open window of Naranjo's vehicle. (R., 
pp.157-63.) The district court denied the motion, ruling Rocky's instinctive act of 
putting his head inside the open window did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
(R., pp.195-96; SH Tr., p.15, L.20 - p.21, L.19.) Naranjo filed a motion for 
reconsideration (R., pp.226-32), which the district court denied after a hearing 
(see generally 12/17/13 Tr.; R., pp.257-58). A jury subsequently found Naranjo 
guilty of possessing methamphetamine, and Naranjo admitted the second 
offense enhancement. (R., pp.262-66, 298.) Naranjo timely appealed from the 


















Naranjo states the issue on appeal as: 
Because probable cause to search Mr. Naranjo's vehicle was 
established only as a result of Officer Loosli's canine partner 
entering Mr. Naranjo's vehicle, did the district court err when it 
denied Mr. Naranjo's motion to suppress and his motion to 
reconsider? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
The district court determined that the dog's instinctive act of putting his head in 
the open truck window did not constitute a search. Has Naranjo failed to show 




















Naranjo Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motions To Suppress 
And For Reconsideration 
Introduction 
The district court concluded that the dog's instinctive act of putting his 
head in the open truck window did not constitute a government search. (R., pp. 
195-96, 257-58; SH Tr., p.15, L.20- p.21, L.19.) Naranjo contends the dog's act 
of putting his nose inside the open driver's side window, during the course of 
what was otherwise a lawful exterior sniff of the vehicle, constituted an unlawful 
search. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-17.) Naranjo's argument fails. Application of the 
law to the facts found by the district court supports the court's conclusion that the 
dog's instinctive act of putting its nose inside the open window was not the act of 
a government agent, and therefore did not violate Naranjo's Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The denial 
of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 




















C. The District Court Correctly Concluded Rocky's Instinctive Act Of Putting 
His Head Inside The Open Driver's Side Window Of Naranjo's Vehicle 
Was Not A Search And Did Not Violate Naranio's Fourth Amendment 
Rights 
The Fourth Amendment does not apply "absent some action taken by 
government agents that can properly be classified as a 'search' or a 'seizure."' 
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1985); see also United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) (Fourth Amendment only applies to 
governmental action, not actions of those who are not government agents); 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (wife's actions within 
scope of Fourth Amendment only if she "acted as an 'instrument' or agent of the 
state when she produced her husband's belongings."); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 
U.S. 103, 146 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Under this Court's precedents, 
only the action of an agent of the government can constitute a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment .... "). Federal appellate courts applying this 
principle are "unanimous in holding that a dog's instinctive jump into a car does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the canine enters the vehicle on its 
own initiative and is neither encouraged nor placed into the vehicle by law 
enforcement." United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir.), cert. den. 
_ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 777 (2012); accord United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 
209, 212-14 (3rd Cir. 2010) (dog's interior sniff not facilitated or encouraged by 
officers "did not constitute a search requiring a warrant or probable cause"); 
United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367, 373 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. 





















The district court found that the drug dog's act of sticking its head into the 
open car window was "instinctive" and not the result of any act or misconduct by 
a government agent. (12/17/13 Tr., p.58, L.1 -p.59, L.20; SH Tr., p.16, Ls.4-16; 
p.16, L.22 - p.17, L. 1; p.21, Ls.15-17.) Because no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment can be found absent some action taken by government agents that 
can properly be classified as a search, the district court properly concluded that 
the dog's instinctual act, taken without any direction or facilitation by a 
government agent, was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Naranjo argues there is no "animal instinct exception to the Fourth 
Amendment." (Appellant's brief, p.13 (capitalization and underlining omitted).) 
The state agrees, but that argument is irrelevant because the state is not relying 
on an exception but rather the well established definition of the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protections. Because the actions of the dog acting instinctively on 
its own without the encouragement of any government agent did not fall within 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment, no exception is needed. 
Naranjo also argues that the recent decisions by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. in Florida v. Jardines, _ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013), 
and United States v. Jones,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012), are counter to 
the district court's holding. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-17.) In those cases officers 
took a drug detection dog onto the curtilage of a home to detect controlled 
substances and physically attached a tracking device to a suspect's car, 
respectively. Both cases therefore involve clear acts by governmental agents 


















situation in this case, where the drug dog acted instinctively instead of at the 
instigation or encouragement of governmental agents. Thus, they offer no 
guidance to the issue presented in this case. 
It is well established that the Fourth Amendment applies only if the act 
constituting a search or seizure is done by a government agent such as a police 
officer or some other person acting at the behest or encouragement of a police 
officer. Here Rocky the dog is not a person and it stuck its nose in the open 
window while instinctively following a scent, not at the behest or encouragement 
of his handler. The district court properly concluded that Naranjo had failed to 
show that the drug dog's instinctive act of putting his nose in an open car window 
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
the denial of Naranjo's motions to suppress and to reconsider. 
DATED this 4th day of May 2015. 
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